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The Sons of Two Fatherlands:
Turkey and the North Caucasian
Diaspora, 1914-1923
Ryan Gingeras
 “We have citizens and co-nationals in the contemporary Turkish nation who wish
to propagate notions about Kurdish-ness,  Circassian-ness and even more so Laz-
ness  or  Bosnian-ness  inside  of  the  political  and  social  collective.  But  this  false
naming, which is a product of the despotism of the past age, for anyone other than
a few reactionary tools of  the enemy and imbeciles,  had no other effect  on the
nation other than worry and stress. Because the individuals of this nation, like the
whole Turkish community, are in possession of a common past, history, morality
and law.”1
“No Matter what happens, it is our obligation to immerse those living in our society
in the civilization of Turkish society and to have them benefit from the prosperity
of civilization. Why should we still speak of the Kurd Mehmet, the Circassian Hasan
or the Laz Ali. This would demonstrate the weakness of the dominant element… If
anybody has any difference inside of him, we need to erase that in the schools and
in the body politic, so that man will be as Turkish as me and serve the homeland.”2
1 Pronouncements such as these underscore the fundamental premise of ethnic politics in
the Republic of Turkey for much of its brief history. Turkish nationalism, as suggested in
the quotes above is the mortar with which the Turkish state is kept together. A rich
heritage and culture binds all those born within Turkey’s borders. To suggest otherwise
condones the subversive and reactionary politics of the Ottoman past. 
2 The above summations on the subject of nationalism in Turkey nevertheless reference a
core truth regarding the nature of politics and society in Anatolia. Turkey is a country of
immense cultural,  religious and ethnic diversity.  Contemporary debates over Kurdish
cultural  or  political  self-expression  represent  only  a  fraction  of  the  profound
heterogeneity  found  among  Turkey’s  citizenry.3 Moreover,  there  was  indeed  a  time,
before  the  Kemalist  ascendency,  when it  was  possible  for  inhabitants  of  Anatolia  to
articulate  and  publicize  differing  notions  of  identity.  Both  of  the  above  statements
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blithely refer to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, an era of unprecedented interest
and activism in the realm of identity politics. 
3 Among the groups referenced above is the North Caucasian diaspora of Anatolia. North
Caucasians, or Circassians as they are more commonly known, comprise a rich smattering
of tribal and linguistic groups drawn from highlands and coastal slopes of the Caucasus
Mountain  range.4 It  is  in  the  diaspora,  mostly  within  Ottoman  Anatolia,  that  these
desperate groupings forged a  more singular  notion of  identity  and national  interest.
North Caucasian figures exercised considerable political influence at various levels of the
Ottoman state. The depths to which Circassian notables were able to shape politics and
policies during the latter years of the Ottoman Empire mirrors the much broader impact
Muslim migrants from Southern Russia had upon imperial affairs.5
4 Nevertheless, even during this period of relative openness with respect to rhetoric and
discourse,  the leading lights of the North Caucasian diaspora ultimately attempted to
place limits upon the interests and desires of their nascent nationalist movement. With
the outbreak of war in 1914 and the looming threat of imperial collapse,  the bulk of
Circassian  officers,  officials  and  intellectuals  in  Anatolia  channeled  their  collective
interests and energies into upholding the Ottoman state. In choosing to remain loyal to
their comrades and the state they served, prominent Circassians tended to subordinate,
but not suppress, their national interests in the Caucasus in light of the crises confronting
Ottoman Anatolia. When one considers the realm of political possibilities during the First
World  War  and its  immediate  aftermath,  this  collective  action appears  all  the  more
striking. In placing themselves and their ethnic interests at the disposal of the Ottoman
Empire,  elite  members  of  North  Caucasian  diaspora  ultimately  elected  to  forgo  any
demand towards self-determination or any other form of national restitution. Circassian
demands for self-determination and national sovereignty were instead directed towards
Ottoman Anatolia and the emerging Kemalist order. 
5 Over the following pages I wish to explore how and why a select cohort of Circassians
concurrently staked a claim to both their adopted home in Anatolia and, to some degree,
their more distant homeland in the Caucasus. I would argue that this period represents
an Ur moment when the politics of Turkey’s North Caucasian diaspora first crystallized.
The  emergence  of  a  clearly  visible  and  mobile  “Circassian  politic”  during  the  years
between 1914 and 1922 strikes at the very heart of identity politics in Asia Minor and the
evolution of  Anatolia  as  a  geographic,  cultural  and political  bridge between multiple
worlds.
6 The unity of action and influence wielded by elite elements of the North Caucasian elite
during  this  period is  also  at  the  heart  of  the  demise  of  this  political  faction in  the
aftermath of the so-called Turkish War of Independence (fought from 1919 to 1922). As we
shall see, the scars and lessons left by this period of warfare, together with ascendency of
Mustafa  Kemal’s  exclusive  entourage,  served to  condemn any expression of  national
interest that deviated from the emerging orthodoxies of Turkish nationalism. It is only
recent years that Circassian diaspora politics has been permitted to resurface.
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Brothers from Another Mother: The Making of the
North Caucasian Elite of Anatolia, 1860-1923
7 A detailed account of the emergence of the modern Middle East is not possible without
mentioning the roles played by the peoples of the North Caucasus. Long before the armies
of the Russian tsars began to push further south into their steppe frontier,  men and
women born or departing from the northeastern shores of the Black Sea were counted
among  the  most  important  or  intimate  members  of  the  empires  that  defined  the
evolution  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean.  Circassian  slave-soldiers  administered  the
political affairs and commanded the armies of the Seljuk, Mamluk, Safavid and Ottoman
states. Fair North Caucasian “beauties” bought in the slave markets of Baghdad, Cairo and
Istanbul became the mothers and matriarchs of the most prominent households of the
darülislam. Scholars of the early modern period have tended, even during this time before
the age of nationalism, to describe the North Caucasians of the great Islamic empires as
an  exclusive  class  within  the  imperial  elite.6 Ironically,  the  early  intermingling  of
Circassians in the politics of  the Islamic lands largely occurred at a time when most
people still residing in the North Caucasus had yet to convert in mass to Islam.7
8  The mass exodus of North Caucasians to the Ottoman Empire, beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century, consummated and solidified the historical links the North Caucasian
peoples now share with the Middle East. Between 1860 and 1914, Russian forces, perhaps
with the connivance of the Ottoman state, expelled hundreds of thousands from their
homes.  Upon  arriving  on  the  Black  Sea’s  southern  shores,  the  refugees  were  then
distributed, often without their consent, to areas of settlement in the southern Balkans,
Anatolia and Syria.  Although a portion of these refugees ultimately did return home,
perhaps  as  many  as  2.5  millions  North  Caucasian  decided  to  build  new lives  in  the
Ottoman lands. If  scholar Kemal Karpat’s estimates are correct,  the population of the
Circassian diaspora at the turn of the twentieth century exceeded the total number of
Kurds living in the Ottoman Empire.8
9 Tremendous logistical and material challenges hampered Istanbul’s efforts to settle these
successive waves of North Caucasian refugees. During the 1860s, tens of thousands of
refugees  died  as  a  result  of  malnutrition,  exposure  and  disease.  Thousands  more
attempted to return home due to dissatisfaction with the lands the government allotted
to them or as result of strife with their new neighbors. All in all, Ottoman officials used
the  crisis  to  their  political  advantage.  In  a  time when  portions  of  the  empire  was
threatened by rebellion, sedition and wear, Istanbul used resettlement of North Caucasian
immigrants as a means of diluting potentially restive native populations (such as Balkan
Christians or Arab nomads) in strategically valuable territories. In addition to portions of
the southern Balkans and Syria,  the overwhelming majority of North Caucasian were
settled various corners of Anatolia.9
10 For  an  unknown  number  of  North  Caucasian  refugees,  the  historic  ties  created  by
Ottoman Caucasian slave trade helped to facilitate a rapid ascendency up the ranks of the
imperial  elite.  Caucasian  slaves,  and  increasingly  their  descendants,  continued  to
populate the households of the most powerful families of the Ottoman Empire during the
nineteenth century. Whether by design or by accident, the institution of slavery allowed
members of the North Caucasian diaspora to integrated themselves into the Ottoman
political elite.  With the gradual replacement of slave administrators by professionally
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trained  bureaucrats  in  the  nineteenth  century,  the  descendents  of  Ottoman-born
Caucasian slaves began to establish their own households, in certain cases transforming
themselves into interlocutors between Istanbul and newly arriving North Caucasians.10
11 The experiences of deportation and exile impacted North Caucasian refugees and their
descendants in several critical ways. First and foremost, the sürgün (or exile in Turkish)
helped to forge a singular, popular notion of collective identity among the incredibly
diverse number of North Caucasian groups who came to reside throughout the eastern
Mediterranean. Although divergences along regional, dialectical, filial and cultural lines
may have contributed to the often fractious (or non-existent) relations between Adige,
Ubıh, Abkhaz, Dagestani, Chechen, Osset and Georgian peoples, the collective experiences
and memories of  flight,  poverty,  mortality and resettlement bonded North Caucasian
refugees  and their  descendants  together.  This  comradery,  which manifested itself  in
schools,  offices  and  within  the  ranks  of  the  military  was  readily  apparent  to  many
outsiders.11
12 Equally homogenizing was the collective designation of the term Circassian [Çerkes] for all
refugees  from the North Caucasus.  Although usage of  the term Çerkes  (or  the plural
Çerakise in Ottoman, Çerkesler in modern Turkish) had a long history within the Ottoman
lands, the diversity found among North Caucasian refugees did little to limit the use of
this collective label. Although it is not entirely clear whether this phenomenon resulted
from the fact that the first and probably the largest contingent of refugees were Adige
and Ubıh (the two groups most often associated with “Circassian-ness”), it is clear that
other manifestations of North Caucasian identity (such as Chechen, Dagestani or even
Abkhazian)  were  marginalized  or  sublimated  in  terms  of  official  parlance  and  self-
representation.12
13 Istanbul’s  initial  overtures  towards  these  newcomers  would  ultimately  cement  ties
between successive generations of North Caucasian elites and the Ottoman state. Sultan
Abdülhamid II in particular endorsed a series of policies that favored North Caucasian
notables seeking upward mobility through state service.  By the outbreak of  the First
World War, the Ottoman officer corps, as well as the state bureaucracy, became heavily
populated by the sons of North Caucasian immigrants.  Many of those who chose the
military as means of upward mobility were allowed to distinguish themselves as a group
apart from the regular rank and file. Dressed in North Caucasian “costumes,” many units
made up of immigrant recruits and officers comprised members of the same extended
family  (who  were  settled  together  in  the  same  village)  and  were  placed  under  the
command of a regional or “tribal” notable.13
14 A viable,  and increasingly  vocal,  milieu of  North Caucasian officers,  bureaucrats  and
intellectuals began to take root in Istanbul in the closing years of the nineteenth century.
At the center of this elite group of North Caucasians was Field Marshal Deli Fuad [Fuad the
Mad], the son of an old Ubıh family from Egypt.14 This emerging elite of North Caucasian
cadres formed a collective voice just after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 with the
establishment of the Society for Circassian Unity and Mutual Aid [Çerkes İttihat ve Teavün
Cemiyeti].  Officially speaking,  Deli  Fuat and other founders of the organization largely
limited  their  activism  to  advancing  the  political  and  cultural  concerns  of  North
Caucasians in the Ottoman lands. Along with subsequent groups formed in Istanbul, such
as the North Caucasian Political  Committee [Şimali  Kafkas  Cemiyet-i  Siyasiyesi]  and the
Circassian Womens’ Mutual Aid Committee [Çerkes Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti], the men and
women who gathered around Deli Fuad campaigned to open Adige language schools (for
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men and as well as women), published newspapers in both Turkish and in Adige and
called  for  the  creation of  an independent  North Caucasian state.15 In  practice,  these
organizations served as the political nexus for the most powerful North Caucasians in the
empire. The Society for Circassian Unity and Mutual Aid and other such North Caucasian
immigrant groups formed an exclusive network of individuals who shared a general set of
political and cultural agendas and values. As bodies gathering together the most elite
strata of Ottoman North Caucasian society, these organizations became closely tied to the
state’s administrative apparatus and in certain respects became quasi-arms of the state
itself (particularly in regards to recruitment and distribution of propaganda).
15 In an era that saw the promotion of an increasingly articulate notion of identity grounded
in Islamic unity and loyalty to the Ottoman state, elite North Caucasians engaged in their
own  internal  debate  over  the  question  of  national  belonging.  As  men  who  were
overwhelmingly acculturated and groomed within the classrooms of the empire’s finest
schools, and as comrades of other equally devoted state employees, high-ranking North
Caucasian officers and officials appeared to have been no less committed to the causes
and rites of twentieth century Ottoman nationalism. In the words of Eşref Kuşçubaşı, one
of the founders of the Ottoman clandestine service, he could not deny that he was a
Circassian who dreamt of Dagestan (the North Caucasus). Yet he was, first and foremost,
“a Muslim Ottoman who spoke Turkish.”16
16 Eşref’s commitment to the Ottoman state and his ability to speak the lingua franca of the
empire did not necessarily mean however that he, or other prominent North Caucasians
like him, equated Ottoman nationalism with ethnic, cultural or even political unanimity.
Parallel to this devotion to the Ottoman sultanate was an equally strong commitment to
the  maintenance  and  exploration  of  “Circassian-ness”  within  the  Ottoman  context.
Newspapers, articles and books discussing the history, the politics and the future of North
Caucasians inside and outside of the empire flourished in Istanbul in the years preceding
the First World War. Among the most active participants in this discourse was Mehmet
Fetgerey (Şoenu), the son of an Ubıh refugee family from just east of Istanbul. As a former
administrator and educator in Istanbul and Macedonia, Mehmet’s career in publishing
began in the years  immediately  following the First  World War.  Although only a  few
pamphlets written by Mehmet Fetgerey have survived to the present day, it appears they
strike upon certain consistent themes. His histories of North Caucasians (which by and
large correspond to Adige history) emphasize their ancient and seemingly European and
Aryan roots. “Circassians” (again, meaning all North Caucasians) savored and guarded
their independence until the sürgün, the great calamity of North Caucasian history. Exile
and the death of tens of thousands did not break the North Caucasian spirit or resolve
towards restoring their independence. Yet,  after their arrival on to the shores of the
Ottoman Empire, Circassians extended their full devotion and loyalty to their sultan and
his Muslim subjects.17A similar pattern of historical and political observations appear to
have been expressed in the works of such older Circassian activists as Aziz Meker and
Yusuf İzzet (Met Çanatuka).18
17 This vision of Circassian life both in the diaspora and back in the homeland was put to the
test once the First World War ended. To borrow a long and overused cliché, the period
immediately follow 1918 represented both the best of times and the worst of times for the
North Caucasian imperial elite. On the one hand, Russia’s utter collapse, coupled with the
Tsar’s ouster, signaled a hopeful turn in North Caucasian affairs. Under the aegis of the
right  of  self-determination,  local  rebels  seized  upon  this  moment  to  form  the
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Mountaineer  Republic,  a  state  that  encompassed  the  lands  of  the  Adige,  Chechens,
Dagestanis and Ingushis. In an era defined by Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the possibility
of self-determination, it is clear that many North Caucasians living in Ottoman Anatolia
hoped to reestablish a connection with, or perhaps return to, their place of origin. 
18 Yet, closer to home, the war had produced the greatest of catastrophes. Defeat in 1918
would result in the fall of the imperial Ottoman government, the collapse of its military
and signaled a radical  redrawing of  its  borders.  This latter crisis  shook the Ottoman
Circassian establishment to its core. For the young, well-educated and established officers
and officials residing in Istanbul or found within the upper ranks of the army, resisting
the  threat  of  foreign  occupation  and  saving  the  Ottoman  state  from  partition  and
dissolution superseded any duty to their more distant homeland. Ultimately, their fealty
to their adopted home came at the expense of realizing their dreams of independence for
the lands their father’s had forfeited. 
 
The North Caucasian Elite and the Turkish War of
Independence 
19 As the British armies closed in on Anatolia in 1918, the Ottoman triumvirate government
appointed  a  young  North  Caucasian  officer  with  the  task  of  bringing  the  war  to  a
dishonorable end. Hüseyin Rauf Orbay, age 37, in many respects represented the cream of
his generation. Born in Istanbul, Rauf was the son of an Abkhazian immigrant father who
rose to serve as the Ottoman governor of the province of Libya. After Rauf graduated
from the Ottoman Naval Academy in 1899, he went on to serve with distinction in the
Balkan and Libyan wars. In 1917 he received the esteemed honor of acting as the Ottoman
representative at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.19 His appointment as head of the Ottoman
delegation at the Modros Armistice in 1918 marked a dramatic reversal in his promising
career. Yet, the harsh terms of the Ottoman surrender however did not dull his ardor or
devotion towards the state he had so faithfully served. In the days before he arrived to
the negotiating table, Rauf Orbay had already included himself in the plans for a war of
resistance against the foreign occupation of Anatolia that was sure to come.20
20 The landing of Greek troops on Izmir’s harbor front on May 15, 1919 is often seen as the
beginning of the Turkish War of Independence. Yet plans for an organized, statewide
campaign of armed resistance to foreign occupation in Anatolia predated the arrival of
the Greek invasion force. Shortly before the flight of the “triumvirate government” in
November 1918, the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) laid the groundwork
for a clandestine operation to thwart the partition of Anatolia. Rauf Orbay, a long time
CUP member, was among the first Young Turk activists to take part in planning and
organization of these National Forces [Kuva-yı Milliye].21 Under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal (Atatürk), who would seize the reins of this resistance in May of 1919, Rauf proved
decisive in bringing other prominent North Caucasian officers into the fold. From the
sources  available  to  us,  it  appears  that  the  recruitment  of  high-ranking  Circassian
officers, intellectuals, bureaucrats and provincial notables was seen as a key element to
the success of the struggle to come. In addition to their outstanding presence in the
Ottoman officer corps (particularly in the Ottoman clandestine service), several members
of the North Caucasian elite possessed close connections to rural paramilitary gangs. In
lieu  of a  regular  army,  the  National  Forces  would  rely  heavily  on  these  provincial
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paramilitaries [çetecis] to fill the ranks of the resistance during its early stages. Several of
the most influential Circassian officers in the Ottoman Empire served during this crucial
stage of the war as both commanders and recruiters of these paramilitaries sent to the
front.22 After the war ended in 1922, the Turkish National Assembly awarded eleven North
Caucasians, out of a grand total of twenty recipients, the honorific title of gazi.23
21 Rauf Orbay’s efforts bore fruit by the summer of 1919. Despite the chaos that ensued the
Greek seizure of Izmir in May of 1919, CUP-turned-Nationalist militants moved quickly to
draw up a defensive parameter around the Greek beachhead in the Aegean. In September,
Mustafa Kemal solidified his control over the National Forces with the convening of the
largest of a series of formal congresses held in the eastern Anatolian town of Sivas. As a
group mostly comprising former CUP members and sympathizers,  the Sivas Congress
stood in direct contravention of the authority of the sultan’s government in Istanbul,
which rightly viewed the gathering as an attempt by the remaining Young Turk caucus to
regain control over the country. 
22 As one browses the names of the participants of the Sivas Congress, one is struck by the
inordinate number of North Caucasians who were in attendance. Out of the possible 38
men who joined the gathering, twelve were of North Caucasian descent.24 Of the fifteen
members of Mustafa Kemal’s central “representative committee,” a body which would
steer the war effort against the foreign occupiers, over a third were of North Caucasian
descent.25 In addition to Rauf Orbay, who had attended the Ottoman military academy
with the future president of Turkey, this exclusive clique of Circassian insiders included
Bekir Sami (Kundukh), the former governor Ottoman Syria, and İbrahim Süreyya (Yiğit), a
CUP activist and former member of the Ottoman clandestine service. Meanwhile, Emin
Marşan  Pasha,  the  Circassian  political/paramilitary  boss  of  Sivas,  assured  that  the
congress would be held without disruptions.26
23 A  number  of  contemporary  scholars  have  interpreted  the  presence  of  such  a  large
number of influential North Caucasian notables within Mustafa Kemal’s inner circle as a
righteous  display  of  Circassian  solidarity  with  the  goals  and  aspirations  of  Turkish
nationalism.27 Yet others argue that the very notion of Turkish nationalism, let alone the
notion of a Turkish nation-state, was far from fully defined at this point in time.28 It is
perhaps  safer  to  say  that  the  contributions  rendered  by  North  Caucasians  to  the
construction  of  Mustafa  Kemal’s  nascent  government  reflected  the  sheer  mass  of
Circassian occupying positions of power within the ranks of the bureaucracy and, above
all,  the military.  Most  of  the North Caucasians who surrounded Mustafa Kemal  were
under forty years of age.29 For the most part, these men had become acquainted with one
another  in  the  years  before  the  First  World  War.  As  friends,  classmates  or  former
comrades-in-arms, pro-Nationalist North Caucasians shared a collective set of interests,
values and ends defined by the Ottoman state and, to a large degree, the Committee of
Union and Progress. Rather than as a testament to a Turkish ethno-nationalism that was
still in its infancy in 1919, this gathering of representatives of the North Caucasian elite
instead should be looked upon as evidence affirming the success to which Abdülhamid II
and CUP state acculturated and groomed large numbers of Circassian immigrants, and
their children, into becoming the guardians of the state.
24 But this is not the only reason why contemporary scholars have so explicitly connected
Circassians  with  the  early  promotion  of  Turkish  nationalism.  North  Caucasian
participation  in  the  National  Movement  occurred  at  a  time  when  other  “minority
interests” in Anatolia sought to undermine or tear asunder the integrity of the Ottoman
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state. The Turkish War of Independence was not simply a war waged by Kemalist forces
against Greek and other occupying armies. Nationalist detachments and guerrilla bands
equally  concerned  themselves  with  the  threat  of  Christian  separatism.  Orthodox
Christians throughout western Anatolia celebrated the Greek landing at Izmir, with many
joining the Greek expeditionary army.30 Meanwhile forces loyal to Mustafa Kemal pushed
eastward against ragtag Armenian groups attempting to hold those portions of eastern
Anatolia designated as Armenian territory under the auspices of the Treaty of Sèvres.31
Considering the supposed severity of the dangers posed by Christian separatists, Mustafa
Kemal and the National Forces depended upon Muslim unanimity in Anatolia. 
25 The prominent  role  played by  Circassian  officers,  officials  and notables  at  the  Sivas
Congress, as well as the Turkish War of Independence overall, stands in particular stark
contrast to relative absence of Kurds in the making of the National Forces. According to
Andrew Mango, not a single Kurd attended the proceedings at Sivas.32 It was only with the
seating of the first Turkish Grand National Assembly after 1920 that Kurdish appointees
came  to  populate  the  upper  ranks  of  Mustafa  Kemal’s  revolutionary  government.33
Despite  the  support  of  some  members  of  the  Kurdish  rural  elite,  Kemalist  forces
nonetheless  worried  about  Kurdish  nationalist  factions  in  Istanbul  that  supported
secession from the Ottoman state.34 Meanwhile, to the east of Sivas, a serious popular
uprising  among Alevi  Kurds  in  Dersim contributed  to  seeping  Nationalist  misgivings
regarding the loyalties of Kurds throughout Anatolia.35
26 By 1921, it became clear to the Kemalist leadership and their Circassian backers that not
all North Caucasians in Anatolia could be counted upon for support. The first indications
that dissenting Circassians were taking up arms against the National Forces occurred in
the  fall  of  1919.  After  a  series  of  minor  confrontations  and  clashes  between  local
paramilitaries and Nationalist detachments, a large-scale rebellion erupted in vicinity of
Bursa and Balıkesir. This state of insurrection lasted for much of the winter and spring of
1920 and would eventually encompass almost the entire southern basin of the Marmara
Sea.36 Meanwhile, to the south in Cilicia, Circassians were wavering in their support of the
National Forces’ struggle against the French occupying force.37
27 There was even uncertainty within the core of  the National  Forces.  One of  the most
prominent  resistance fighters,  a  Circassian by the name of  Çerkes  Ethem,  broke with
Mustafa Kemal and surrendered his command to the Greek commander on the Aegean
front.38 Ethem’s capitulation to the Greeks was soon followed by an even more vulgar
display of “Circassian treason.” In November of 1921, a meeting of provincial Circassian
notables  was  held  in  Greek-occupied  Izmir.  In  a  series  of  declarations  circulated
throughout Anatolia and to various Western delegations, the congress, calling itself the
Association for the Strengthening of Near Eastern Circassian Rights, declared that it was
the intention of all North Caucasians in Anatolia to abandon the Nationalist struggle and
to form a joint Greek-Circassian protectorate in northwestern Anatolia. After decades of
mistreatment  by  the  Ottoman  government  following  their  mass  exodus  from  the
Caucasus, the congress argued that Circassians now feared that the National Movement
was  seeking  to  exterminate  them much as  the  Ottoman government  had  previously
attempted to wipe out Anatolia’s Greek and Armenian population.39
28 From the point of view of supporters of the Kemalist forces, such acts of rebellion seemed
to  suggest  that  Muslim  Circassians  were  aligning  themselves  with  the  interests  of
Christian secession. For the sake of external appearances, as well as internal unanimity,
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North Caucasian supporters of the National Movement sought at every turn to play down
suggestions of Circassian discord and affirm their loyalty to the Nationalist cause.
29 On the morning of 28 November 1921, a group of Circassian intellectuals, officers and
notables gathered in Besiktaş, just north of Istanbul’s old quarter, to release a statement
countering the demands of the Near Eastern Caucasian Association. The group was led by
two men who typified the Circassian establishment in Istanbul: (Big) Ahmet Fevzi Pasha
and Deli Fuat Pasha. The group told the crowd that gathered that the Association for the
Strengthening of Near Eastern Circassian Rights was composed of “good-for-nothings,”
such as the “traitor” Çerkes Ethem.40 The association, it was claimed, was composed of
only “ten to fifteen men from Bandırma,” a town which had been an epicenter for anti-
Nationalist activity. As for the other Circassians who had assembled in Izmir, the Beşiktaş
committee accused the Greek occupational authorities in the town of forcing them men
to sign on to the plan to secede from Ottoman state.41
30 An  even  more  dramatic  display  of  Circassian  fealty  to  the  Ottoman  state  and  the
sovereignty  of  Anatolia  was  printed  days  after  the  assembly  in  Izmir  in  the  pro-
Nationalist Ankara daily, Hakimiyet-i  Milliye.  In an open letter undersigned by 26 state
functionaries and notables of Circassian descent from the town of Düzce, the Besiktaş
committee’s rejection of the Near Eastern Caucasian Association’s demands was seconded.
Circassians, the Düzce representative countered, had long been treated well by the Turks.
Circassian immigrants, like their Turkish brothers, willfully marched off to the Balkan
War and to the Great War in the name of the Ottoman state and suffered along side their
Turkish comrades. Through such trials and sacrifices, no Circassian would accept the rule
of any other state.42
31 Before the members of the recently created National Assembly in Ankara, one member
also rose to defend and explain the feelings and loyalties of Circassians. Having never
served  in  the  military,  Hakkı  Hami  (Ulukan)  was  an  unlikely  member  of  the  North
Caucasian elite. The son of Abkhazian immigrants, Hakkı had practiced law in his native
town of Sinop before joining the National Movement.43 On the 3rd of November, he offered
the following rendition of the North Caucasian experience in Anatolia: 
32 At one time gentlemen you know that Circassians [now] living and working in Turkey
were unwilling to put up with Tsarist oppression and took shelter in Turkey. They saw a
great  deal  of  compassion  from  the  Turks  and  [saw]  that  they  always  possessed  a
distinguished kind of benevolence. They were cast upon the compassion of the Turk’s
bosom. Ever since that time the Circassians have not seen the slightest degree injury from
the Turks. Perhaps Turks held them in far greater esteem and supported them in this
nation (Bravo!) There is no suspicion that they are separate from the Turks and I declare
that Turks and Circassians have become close relatives (Bravo!).
33 It  is  more than this,  gentlemen! Circassians,  your government is  not a base one like
Greece. Do not commit such a vile act as to accept the patronage of any Christian state.
And you should not accept that kind of debasement. One who accepts Greek protection or
the protection of any other Christian [state] is not a Circassian and a Muslim. That person
becomes a Christian. He is a person doubtful of his nation and his position.
34 In the midst of the cheers and bravos that were interjected towards the end of Hakkı
Hami’s address, Rauf Orbay himself intoned, “There cannot be a traitorous nation!”44
35 Further  than  these  impassioned  pleas  for  fealty  towards  the  Ottoman state  and  the
National Movement, these statements uttered by pro-Nationalist Circassians in Beşiktaş,
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Düzce  and  Ankara  reveal  much  about  what  it  meant  to  be  North  Caucasian  and  a
supporter  of  the emerging Turkish order.  Above all  things,  support  for  the National
Movement represented a debt that was to be paid. As a movement representing the re-
establishment of a sovereign, strong state (which was to be led by the same cohort of
young servicemen and statesmen who had governed the land before the outbreak of the
First  World  War),  the  National  Movement  (as  rendered  by  Hakkı  Hami  and  others)
represented the same set of benefactors who had welcomed North Caucasians into the
Ottoman lands. Yet, as “brothers,” there seems to be an understanding among these elite
Circassians that they were still a set apart from the “Turks.” They were, in other words,
partners with an equal share with twin interests in the survival of the state. Interestingly,
this  internal  consensus among pro-Nationalist  North Caucasians mirrored the way in
which Kurdish participation in the Kemalist movement was also framed at this time.45
Their identity and integrity as a sub-branch of Ottoman society was to be respected in
participating in this grand campaign for Anatolia’s liberation.
 
The Motherland Slips Away: The Circassian Elite and
the Fate of the Caucasus
36 Combatants engaged in the struggle over the future of Anatolia were not ignorant of the
large questions of how the break up of Europe’s empires would progress in the aftermath
of  the First  World War.  It  was clear immediately after the guns fell  silent  along the
Western  Front  that  imperial  borders  encompassing such  desperate  lands  as  Ireland,
Ukraine, India, Iraq and China would be redrawn or reconsidered.46 Members of the North
Caucasian elite in Anatolia were no less ignorant of the possibilities afoot. Yet, from the
perspective of those who had thrown in their lot with the National Movement, precisely
what services Nationalist Circassians could render to lands of their fathers was unclear. 
37 Istanbul had cultivated a strong interest in the politic future of the North Caucasus long
before  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War.  As  Michael  Reynolds  has  articulately
demonstrated, Young Turk policy in the Caucasus was determined less by ideological or
nationalist  prerogatives  as  it  was  an expression of  an ongoing geo-strategic  struggle
between the Ottoman Empire,  imperial  Russia  and Iran.47 Among the assets  the CUP
government  had  at  its  disposal  were  the  members  of  the  Circassian  elite  who  had
organized  themselves  into  such  lobbying  groups  as  the  North  Caucasian  Political
Committee. According to Mustafa Butbay, an Abkhazian activist and academic with close
ties to Istanbul’s North Caucasian consensus, the ruling Committee of Union and Progress
viewed the  North  Caucasian  Political  Committee  as  an  instrument  in  promoting  the
creation of an allied independent Muslim buffer states in the Caucasus.48
38 Ironically, despite the fall of the Young Turk government in 1918, events in Russia would
ultimately  produce  an  outcome  that  seemed  to  favor  Istanbul.  In  the  midst  of  civil
upheaval and revolution, local notables in the North Caucasus, representing a coalition of
Muslim Adige, Abkhazians, Dagestanis, Chechens and Kumuks, rallied in 1918 to form a
republic in tune with Woodrow Wilson’s principles of self-determination. In what Michael
Reynolds describes as a move to protect the region’s “culture and identity,” the founding
members of this “Union of Allied Mountaineers” exercised a fairly realist agenda in the
midst of the Russian Civil War (1917-1923). Clear internal divisions however ran through
the leadership of  this  self-styled North Caucasian Republic  along social, political  and
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ethnic  lines.49 On  4June  1918,  the  Ottoman government,  in  a  “treaty  of  friendship”,
formally recognized the existence of this nascent state.50
39 Meanwhile, during the closing stages of the First World War, Ottoman forces had pushed
well  into  the  southern  Caucasus.  In  September  1918,  advancing  Ottoman  troops
recaptured the disputed provinces of Batum, Kars and Ardahan and occupied large swaths
of Azerbaijan. On the same day as Istanbul recognized the North Caucasian Republic, a
small Ottoman force under the command of İsmail Hakkı (Berkok) entered Dagestan. The
son of Adige immigrants from Uzunyayla, İsmail quickly set out to establish a locally
recruited force in order to further drive Russian forces out of the Dagestan and secure an
Ottoman foothold close to the oil-rich city of Baku. A much larger force under Yusuf İzzet
(Met Çanatuka) Pasha, a longtime fixture of the Istanbul’s Circassian circle, arrived in
support for this adventure. Even before the signing of the Modros armistice forced all
Ottoman  troops  to  withdraw  from  the  Caucasus,  the  lack  of  resources,  Bolshevik
opposition and local resistance and indifference spoiled much of their advances.51
40 In the months after the signing of the Modros armistice, Circassian activists in Istanbul
resumed contact with representatives of the North Caucasian Republic. At some point in
1919, a delegation led by the prime minister of the North Caucasian Republic, Abdülmecit
Çermoyef,  and  the  Republic’s  foreign  minister,  Haydar  Bamat,  met  with  notable
Circassian activists  in  Istanbul  in  the hopes  of  gleaning Nationalist  support.  Mustafa
Kemal reportedly consented to the requests of the delegation and in turn sanctioned the
sending of a Nationalist delegation to the Caucasus in 1919. Under Ankara’s orders, İsmail
Hakkı  (Berkok)  was  picked alongside  Aziz  Meker,  a  Caucasian-born teacher  based in
Istanbul, to lead this clandestine mission.52
41 As one reads the memoirs of Mustafa Butbay, who accompanied this delegation, İsmail
Hakkı and Aziz encountered problems from nearly the start. As Soviet, White and local
forces  surged  back  and  forth  over  the  Caucasus,  Nationalist  delegates  had  trouble
obtaining  a  stable  consensus  among  local  factions.  Mustafa  Butbay  was  particularly
frustrated  with  the  behavior  of  Celal  Korkmazof  (alternately  also  called  Celaladdin
Korkmaz), a native Kumyk who was among the leading promoters of the Bolshevik effort
in the North Caucasus. Much to Butbay’s disappointment, Korkmazof refused to place the
cause of a united, independent North Caucasus above his Bolshevist leanings.53
42 The establishment of a formal Nationalist government under Mustafa Kemal in April 1920
initially  did  not  lead to  any  deviation of  past  Ottoman policies  of  supporting  North
Caucasian independence. In an early session of the Turkish National Assembly in Ankara,
Mustafa Kemal declared:
[…] Circassians are working towards their goals. They too are in cordial relations
with us. In that degree, they see Turkey’s salvation, existence and independence as
connect  to  their  own  lives  and  existence  and  they  set  their  heart  to  this.  Our
recommendation to our co-religionists over there too is to show and affirm their
existence with their own forces in their own region and then to be an example that
they will be a part of the Islamic lands. And we can say that our home and our
national independence and salvation is not far from the manifestation of Caucasian
national  aspirations  and  activities  from  their  point  of  view.  Our  patriotism  is
entirely considered to be like a part of theirs.54
43 Nationalist policy towards the Caucasus gradually shifted however as Ankara forged more
permanent relations with the Soviet Union. Contact between Mustafa Kemal’s National
Forces and the Bolshevik government first commenced in the fall of 1919. On 11 January
1920, representatives from both sides signed the first mutual assistance and friendship
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agreement. In the agreement, the Soviets demanded that the Nationalists recognize the
establishment of Soviet republics in Dagestan and Turkestan.55In the summer 1920, in a
report to the Nationalist steering committee, it was agreed that the Nationalists could
work  hand  in  hand  with  the  Soviet  regime  on  issues  related  to  North  Caucasian
sovereignty.  Aziz  Meker,  for  example,  posed that  “Muslims  and Bolsheviks”  were  in
agreement that North Caucasian lands formerly stolen by “Russians and Cossacks” be
returned to native custody.56
44 In the summer of 1920, the Kemalist government in Ankara assembled its first regular
ambassadorial mission to the Soviet Union. Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), a close friend and ally of
Mustafa Kemal who was of North Caucasian descent on his mother’s side, headed this
mission. Ali Fuat brought a coterie of other North Caucasian officers and veterans with
him to  Moscow.57 Meanwhile,  back  in  Ankara,  Mustafa  Kemal  turned  to  Bekir  Sami
(Kundukh), one of the most powerful North Caucasian figures within the Nationalist inner
circle, to lead the Nationalist foreign ministry.58
45 In  October  1920,  direct  negotiations  officially  opened between the  Soviet  Union and
Mustafa Kemal’s National Movement. Several sensitive questions, principally concerning
borders,  Soviet  financial  support  and  the  status  of  the  Turkish  Communist  Party,
separated  the  two  parties.  Bekir  Sami,  it  appears  however,  expressed  to  his  Soviet
counterparts an inordinate amount of personal interest in the cause of North Caucasian
independence. Even before his arrival to Moscow, Soviet officials accused Bekir Sami of
agitating  among  the  inhabitants  of  Ingushetia  during  his  inbound  trip  through  the
Caucasus.59 In one purported session with Soviet Foreign Minister Georgi Chicherin, Bekir
Sami opened up the possibility of a trade whereby Ossetia (the land of his birth) would
receive independence in exchange for Armenia’s acquisition of the Ottoman province of
Van.60
46 Bekir Sami’s private designs ultimately conflicted with Ankara’s larger strategic interests.
After  voicing  his  opposition  to  signing  any  peace  agreement  with  France  and  Great
Britain, Bekir Sami was forced to resign from his post and was sent into retirement.61 In
the months following the assertion of Red Army control over the region in June 1920,
Ankara relinquished direct interest in North Caucasian independence. With the signing of
the Treaty of Moscow on 16 March 1921,  all  issues pertaining to the North Caucasus
remained off the table.62
47 Ankara’s renunciation of any support for independence among the people of the North
Caucasus was only one element of the concessions made in the hopes of receiving political
and material assistance from the Soviet Union. The Kemalist government also renounced
all claims to the strategic province of Batum, which had been seized by imperial Russia in
1878. In the lead up to the First World War, calls for Batum’s return to Ottoman control
was among the more powerful rallying cries of Young Turk government.63 When war with
Russia began in late 1914, a number of Circassian officers played a direct role in Ottoman
attempts  at  liberating  the  region  from Russian  control.  Many,  for example,  actively
organized guerrilla bands among the native Ajari population in the region.64
48 With the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from the Caucasus at the end of the First World
War, Batum briefly fell under British occupation. In the midst of the British occupation,
Nationalist agents  continued  to  maintain  contact  with  sympathetic  Ajari  notables
(although, according to one British report, Mehmet Kişkinzade, a local Ajar leader, turned
down  direct  contact  with  Mustafa  Kemal  and  refused  to  become  embroiled  in  the
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Nationalist  conflict).65 When Nationalist  troops finally  entered Batum in March 1921,
Ankara’s  continued need for  Soviet  support  ultimately  trumped long held  territorial
interests.66 After the Menshevik government of Georgia, which laid claim to Batum, was
overthrown by the Red Army, Ankara agreed to cede any claim to Batum but compelled
the Soviets to grant special administrative and cultural status to the Muslims of Ajaria.67
49 There  is  some evidence  that  suggests  that  elements  of  the  North  Caucasian  elite  in
Anatolia were thoroughly displeased with this turn of affairs and distrustful of Moscow’s
intentions. In an article published in Tehvir-i Efkar, one anonymous observer argued that
the Soviet occupation of the North Caucasus would assuredly mark a return to the sort of
oppression  that  defined  Russian  imperial  rule  in  the  region.68 Nevertheless,  another
commentator  writing  a  few days  later  reminded  North  Caucasians  that  while  North
Caucasians should certainly be “pondering their fatherland’s freedoms in the Caucasus,”
they should also “recognize their duty to the Turkish fatherland’s freedom.”69
50 In short, in assessing the role of elite Ottoman North Caucasians in confronting the future
of their ancestral lands, it is clear that there were limits to which their personal interests
and aspirations  could be  expressed or  realized.  As  the  beneficiaries  of  the  reformed
Ottoman state and as devotees of the Young Turk-turned-Nationalist cause, the North
Caucasians  who threw in their  lot  with Mustafa  Kemal  understood that  there  was  a
defined order that limited their ability to affect the course of Ankara’s dealings with the
Soviet Union.  Despite a long legacy of  activism and,  in certain cases,  direct personal
involvement, Nationalist Circassian officers, officials and notables understood (or were
made to understand) that their primary loyalty resided in Anatolia. In other words, the
struggle over the survival of the adopted fatherland ultimately overshadowed affairs in
their ancestral lands.70 Nevertheless, as men with roots and personal passions invested in
the future of the Caucasus, they allowed themselves to be used as an instrument of those
new prerogatives and directives.
 
Conclusion: North Caucasians, Republican Politics
and the Suspension of “Minority” Activism
51 It  is  difficult  to  overstate  the  profound  impact  the  violence  of  the  Turkish  War  of
Independence had upon the early Turkish Republic. The sheer devastation wrought by
the  conflict  transformed  the  Anatolian  countryside.  Millions  of  people  throughout
Anatolia, both Muslim and Christian, were displaced as a result of both the fighting and
the “population exchanges” that followed the end of the war. The Nationalist victory over
the Greek expeditionary army, as well as the departure of British, French, Italian and
Armenian forces, cemented Mustafa Kemal’s rise as the powerful and legitimate political
leader in Anatolia. The Greek defeat, coupled with the mass eviction of native Orthodox
Christians  from  throughout  Asia  Minor,  affirmed  the  Nationalist  supposition  that
Anatolia was a supremely Muslim land and could not be partitioned or divided. Localist
resistance to the Nationalist government in eastern Anatolia among Muslim Kurds cast
similar doubts regarding their loyalty to a singular and unified Anatolia under Ankara’s
control. Following the Şeyh Sait rebellion of 1925, the Kemalist regime took increasingly
more  violent  and  stringent  steps  to  eliminate  the  slightest  possibility  of  a  Kurdish
separatist movement.71
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52 The close of the Turkish War of Independence also had a chilling effect upon the politics
of the North Caucasian diaspora. The departure of Greek troops from western Anatolia,
for example, led to a brief, and largely isolated, outbreak of rebellion among Circassian
communities along the southern coast of the sea of Marmara. Ankara greeted with these
acts of insurrection (which were by largely undertaken by a few hundred fighters) with a
campaign of mass deportation targeting Circassian communities in the regions of Gönen
and Manyas.72 One scholar has suggested that Nationalist acts of collective punishment
direct at Circassians greatly unsettled North Caucasian leaders in Ankara. According to
İzzet  Aydemir,  Rauf  Orbay  and  others  personally  intervened  on  the  behalf  of  the
Circassian deportees from Gönen and Manyas. Eventually, it appears that the deportees
were allowed to return home.73
53 Several North Caucasians in the upper ranks of the early Kemalist state would face a
similar fate as the first decade of Republican rule progressed. An aborted assassination
attempt  on  Mustafa  Kemal  in  Izmir  in  1926  eventually  led  to  the  prosecution  and
conviction of many of the most powerful Circassian figures to emerge out of the late
Ottoman regime, including Rauf Orbay, Bekir Sami Kundukh, İsmail Canbulat and Ali Fuat
Cebesoy.74Arsen  Avagyan  argues  that  the  prosecution  of  these  individuals  not  only
comprised a direct attack upon Mustafa Kemal’s personal opponents, but was an attempt
to marginalize influential Circassians in the Turkish Republic. During a period of time
when  Ankara  was  increasingly  suspicious  towards  all  potential  centers  of  political
resistance to the imposition of one-party Republican rule, the Kemalist regime, according
to  Avagyan,  came  to  view  elite  North  Caucasians,  arguably  like  Kurds,  Greeks  and
Armenians before them, collectively as a “special threat.”75
54 The rigid and uncompromising imposition of Turkish nationalism during the 1920s and
1930s excluded any possibility for even the suggestion that a North Caucasian diaspora
existed in Anatolia (let alone that North Caucasians could be found in positions of power).
Adige and other North Caucasian languages, as well the usage of the epithet Çerkes, were
banned in Turkey.76 Kurds and other “minorities” in early Republican Turkey contended
with similar policies  restricting or forbidding ethnic or religious difference from the
“Turkish” norm.77
55 The Democratic victory of 1950 marks an important point in the restoration of North
Caucasian  politics  in  Anatolia.  With  the  relaxation  of  overt  political  suppression  of
popular movements, Ankara did allow for the establishment of the first Republican era
“cultural association [dernek]” that catered to diaspora North Caucasian interests in 1954.
78 The size and influence of North Caucasian diaspora organizations has continued to
increase since then.  Unlike the elite  politics  of  the late  Ottoman period,  the activist
groups that exist today reflect a far more popular base of support. Moreover, since the
1980s,  the  opening  of  the  Turkish  political  process  has  allowed  for  greater  internal
differentiation  along  political,  ideological  and  regional  lines  within  Turkey’s  North
Caucasian population.79 Increasingly, North Caucasian diaspora groups, like the Caucasian
Association (Kafder), have come to play a role as an advocate for Turkish foreign policy in
the Caucasus. However, as in the 1920s, the individual interests of these organizations
appear in tune with overall Turkish national interests.80
56 News coverage of recent North Caucasian popular demonstrations in favour of expanded
cultural  and  political  rights  has  drawn  comparisons  with  contemporary  Kurdish
nationalist activism in Turkey.81 The two movements, for example, share similar demands
with  respect  to  their  respective  positions  on language  rights.  Yet  the  contemporary
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maturation  of  North  Caucasian  activism  differs  sharply  from  the  kind  of  struggles
Kurdish activists have encountered during the last sixty years. No Circassian insurgency
emerged in the wake of the oppressive policies of the Kemalist period. Recent events in
Istanbul  further  suggest  that  outward  displays  of  North  Caucasian  activism  are  not
popularly, nor officially, met with violence or consternation.82 The relatively generalized
acceptance of North Caucasian activism contrasts sharply with the ongoing travails facing
proponents of Kurdish rights in Turkey. Violence, oppression and mistrust continue to
plague Ankara’s relationship with its Kurdish constituents despite recent reforms and
promises.83
57 This  stark  contrast  appears  more  understandable  against  the  backdrop  of  Ottoman
politics  between  the  years  1918  and  1923.  The  visibility  and  acceptance  of  North
Caucasian  identity  in  Turkey  today  is  a  testament  to  the  historical  integration  of
Circassians into upper echelons of political power in Anatolia. Indeed the very notion of a
Circassian identity in Turkey, one that amalgamates and sublimates the diversity found
among the diverse descendants of immigrants from the North Caucasus, is an artefact of
the activism of the late Ottoman period. One could argue that North Caucasians in Turkey
today owe much to  the  officers,  politicians  and activists  who remained loyal  to  the
Ottoman state and the Nationalist cause between the years 1914 and 1922. The fealty and
direct  participation of  so many notable  Circassian figures helped to spare the North
Caucasian  diaspora  at  large  from  accusations  of  treasons  or  general  suspicions  of
separatism. Even the severity of the Kemalist policies during the first two decades of the
Republic’s history have not spoiled North Caucasian standing within Turkish body politic.
Both then and now, certain limits define the expressions of North Caucasian identity or
exclusivity. Attachment to their native lands or support for the independence movements
in the North Caucasus have historically been channelled through elitist support of the
Ottoman or Turkish state. North Caucasian and Turkish aspirations, in other words, are
not separate or exclusive; as “close relatives,” Circassian political interests compliment
the machinations and the continuation of the Turkish state.84
NOTES
1.  Ayşe  Afetinan,  Medeni  Bilgiler  ve  M.  K.  Atatürk  El  Yazıları (Ankara,  Türk  Tarih  Kurumu,
1968),p. 23.
2.  This is an excerpt from a speech from Şükrü Kaya, then Minister of the Interior, in a speech
before the Grand National Assembly in 1934. It is cited in Uğur Ümit Üngör, The Making of Modern
Turkey (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 176.
3.  See  for  example  Hamit  Bozarslan,  Conflict  kurde:  Le  Brasier  oublié  du  Moyen-Orient  (Paris,
Autrement, 2009).
4.  Here  I  have opted to  use  the terms “Circassian” and “North Caucasian” interchangeably.
Admittedly “North Caucasian” is a more suitable term to describe the full range of peoples from
the lands north of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan (Chechens, Adige, Dagestanis and so forth).
The term “Circassian,” both historically and in contemporary usage, has been used to apply to all
peoples  of  the  North  Caucasus.  Nevertheless,  in  terms  of  its  original  meaning,  “Circassian”
The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923
European Journal of Turkish Studies , Complete List
15
admittedly has been a term that has also been specifically applied to the Adige and Kabardinian
peoples of the northwestern Caucasus. For further discussion on North Caucasian identity and
naming issues,  see  George Hewitt,  “Abkhazia,  Georgia  and the Circassians  (NW Caucasus),  in
Central Asian Survey 18.4 (1999), p. 465.
5.  It should be noted that a select number of Azeri and Tatar migrants did play a role in the
forging of both Ottoman and Turkish politics. However, unlike Circassians in Anatolia, Azeris and
Tatars  did  not  play  as  visible  a  role  as  individual  mass  movements.  See  for  example  Hakan
Kirimli, National Movements and National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916 (Leiden, Brill,
1996); James H. Meyer, “Immigration, Return and the Politics of Citizenship: Russian Muslims in
the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1914,” in International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 (2007), pp. 15-32;
James Meyer, “Turkic Worlds: Community Representation and Collective Identity in the Russian
and  Ottoman  Empires,  1870-1914,”  Ph.D.  diss.  Brown  University,  2007,  pp. 218-255;  A.  Holly
Shissler, Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003).
6. J.C. Garcin, "The Regime of the Circassian Mamluks," in C.F. Petry, ed.,The Cambridge History of
Egypt I: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 290–317; David
Morgan, Medieval Persia, 1040-1797 (London, Longman Press, 1988), pp. 129, 130, 134; P. Oberling,
“Georgians and Circassians in Iran,” in Studia Caucasica,vol. 1 (1963), pp. 127-143. 
7.  Kemal Karpat, “The Status of the Muslim under European Rule: The Eviction and Settlement of
the Çerkes,” Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History,ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden, E.J. Brill Press,
2002), pp. 651-652; Michael Reynolds, “Myths and Mysticism: A Longitudinal Perspective on Islam
and  Conflict  in  the  North  Caucasus,”  Middle  Eastern  Studies,  41.1  (January  2005),  pp. 37-41.
Conversion  to  Islam,  which  first  began  during  the  seventh  century  but  intensified  during
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, varied among the many groups in the North Caucasus.
Many  Adige  peoples  converted  after  local  notables  accepted  the  suzerainty  of  the  Crimean
Khanate.  Others  (most  notably  Chechens  and  Dagestanis)  were  more  influenced  by  Sufi
missionaries  (particularly  Nakshibandis).  There  also  remains  a  very  large  Christian  Adige
population  in  the  North  Caucasus,  which  was  not  expelled  by  Russian  forces  in  the  mid-
nineteenth century. Other Christian groups in the North Caucasus include numerous Ossets and
Georgian speakers (not to mention transplanted Cossacks).
8.  Kemal Karpat,  Ottoman Population,  1830-1914:  Demographic  and Social  Characteristics (Madison,
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 57, 69.
9.  For  relevant  statistics  on  Circassian  settlement  of  Anatolia  during  the  mid-nineteenth
century, see Arsen Avagyan, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Kemalist Türkiye’nin Devlet-İktidar Sisteminde
Çerkesler (Istanbul, Belge Yayınları 2004), p. 71.
10.  Dror Ze’evi,  “Kul  and Getting Cooler:  The Dissolution of  Elite Collective Identity and the
Formation of Official Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire,” Mediterranean Historical Review 11.2
(1996), pp. 177-196.
11.  Rıza Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, Cilt II (Istanbul, Atındağ Yayınevi, 1968), pp. 468-469. 
12.  The  most  common  context  where  one  finds  individuals  who  designate  themselves  as
something other  than Çerkes  is  in  reports  emanating from provincial  offices  of  the  Ottoman
Empire. State officials do mention bandits, low-ranking office holders and other “provincials”
who appropriate the epithet Abkhazian or Abaza. One sees too a far lesser extent cases where an
individual,  of either high or low birth, uses epithets like “from Dagestan [Dağıstanlı]” or “the
Chechen [Çeçen].”
13.  Sabri Yetkin’s study of banditry in the Aegean region of Anatolia describes in detail  the
recruitment  methods  of  two  well-known  (and  later  notorious)  Circassian  notables  turned
gendarmerie officers,  (Kuşçubaşı)  Sami and Ahmet Anzavur.  See Sabri  Yetkin,  Ege’de Eşkiyalık
(Istanbul, Türk Tarih Vafkı, 2003), pp. 161-171.
14.  Sefer Berzeg, Türkiye Kurtuluş  Savaş’ında Çerkes Göçmenleri,  Cilt II (Istanbul, Ekin Yayıncılık,
1990), pp. 12-13. 
The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923
European Journal of Turkish Studies , Complete List
16
15.  Avagyan, pp. 132-135.
16.  Eşref Kuşçubaşı, Hayber’de Türk Cengi (İstanbul, Araba Yayınları, 1997), p. 221.
17.  Mehmet  Fetgerey  Şoenu,  Çerkesler  (Istanbul,  Nacım  İstiqbal  Matbaası,  1922);  Mehmet
Fertgerey Şoenu, Çerkeslerin Asılı (Istanbul, Şams Matbaası, 1922); Mehmet Fetgerey Şoenu, Çerkes
Mes’elesi (Istanbul, Bedir Yayınevi 1993), pp. 7-8.
18.  Aziz Meker, Les Russes en Circassie, 1760-1864 (Bern, 1919); Muhittin Ünal, Kurtuluş Savaşında
Çerkeslerin Rolü (Ankara, Takav Matbaası, 2000), p. 41.
19.  Cemal Kutay, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Yüzyılımızda bir İnsanımız, Hüseyin Rauf Orbay, 1881-1964
(Istanbul, Kazanç Kitap Ticaret, 1995), p. 59.
20.  Erik Jan Zürcher,  The Unionist  Factor:  The Role of  the Committee of  Union and Progress in the
Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926 (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1984), p. 117.
21.  “Rauf Orbay’ın Hatıraları,” Yakın Tarihimiz 1.6 (5 April 1962), p. 179; For a wider account on
the building of the National Movement, see Zürcher, Unionist Factor, pp. 68-117.
22.  Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 55-77.
23.  Avagyan, p. 155.
24.  It should be noted that it is noted that it is not clear how many representatives actually
attended the Sivas congress. According to Erik Jan Zürcher, the total number of participants in
attendance by the end of the proceedings ranged anywhere between 29 and 38.  See Erik Jan
Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908-1938,”
in Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden, E.J. Brill Press, 2000), p. 166.
25.  Ünal, p. 67.
26.  Avagyan, pp. 176-177.
27.  Berzeg, Çerkes Göçmenleri,pp. 5-6; Mitat Çelikpala, “From Immigrants to Diaspora: Influence of
the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey,” in Middle East Studies 42.3 (2006), p. 427; Metin Sever,
Kafdağı’nın Bu Yüzü (Istanbul, Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999), pp. 39-53; Ünal, passim.
28.  See Howard Eissenstat, “The Limits of Imagination: Debating the Nation and Constructing the
State in Early Turkish Nationalism,” diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2007, pp. 67-127. 
29.  Rauf Orbay, Cemil Cahit Toydemir and Hakkı Behiç were each under the age of forty. Bekir
Sami (Kunduk), who was 54, and Tanbiy Ömer Mümtaz, age 60, were among the oldest of the
North Caucasians to join Mustafa Kemal at Sivas.
30.  The intensity and pervasiveness of anti-Ottoman sentiments among both native Greeks and
Armenians in the immediate aftermath of the war was a phenomenon well documented in both
Ottoman  and  non-Ottoman  sources.  For  just  a  few  examples,  PRO/FO  371/4159/144275,  22
October 1919; PRO/FO 608/103/10733, 22 May 1919; Adnan Sofuoğlu, Kuva-yı  Milliye Döneminde
Kuzeybatı Anadolu, 1919-1921 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basım Evi, 1994), pp. 37-41.
31.  Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Towards Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 1993), pp. 124-132.
32.  See Andrew Mango, “Atatürk and the Kurds,” in Middle East Studies 35.4 (October 1999), p. 9.
33.  Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State (London, Zed Books, 1992), p. 279.
34.  See Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State (Albany, State University of New
York Press, 2004), p. 126.
35.  Özoğlu, 126; Türk Cumhuriyet Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harb Tarihi Dairesi. Türk İstiklal Harbi:
VI’ıncı Cilt, İç Ayaklanması (1919-1921) (Ankara, Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1964), pp. 151-172.
36.  Ryan Gingeras  “Notorious  Subjects,  Invisible  Citizens:  North Caucasian Resistance to  the
Turkish National Movement in the South Marmara, 1919-1923,” in International Journal of Middle
East Studies,40.1 (February, 2008), pp. 96-99.
37.  British intelligence suggested in 1920 that  French authorities  in  southern Anatolia  were
offering local North Caucasians a “little Circassia” in Cilicia. See PRO/FO 371/5048/5042, 20 May
1920.
The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923
European Journal of Turkish Studies , Complete List
17
38.  See Çerkes Ethem, Hatıralarım (Istanbul, Berfin Yayınları, 1998), p. 133.
39.  Gingeras  “Notorious  Subjects,  Invisible  Citizens,”  pp. 99-102.  While  it  is  clear  that  many
within Nationalist  circles  interpreted this  act  as  a  manifestation of  Circassian “treason”,  the
motivations and aims of the Association for the Strengthening of Near Eastern Circassian Rights
were provincial rooted and unpopular. 
40.  “Çerkesler’in Dünkü İctimai,” in Vakit 29 November 1921.
41.  “Çerkeslerle  Türkler  arasında  Münasebet,”  in  İkdam,  29  November  1921;  “Türkler  ve
Çerkesler Kütle ve Ahdedarlar,” in Vakit, 30 November 1921.
42.  Düzce Çerkesleri,” Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 12 December 1921.
43.  Ünal, Çerkeslerin Rolü, pp. 140-141.
44. T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt 24. (Ankara, TBMM Matbaası,1960), p. 367.
45.  Mango, “Atatürk and the Kurds,” 10-11. In one telegram sent to Kurdish representatives,
Mustafa  Kemal  described  “Turks”  and  “Kurds”  as  “two  brothers  joining  hands  in  their
determination to defend their sacred unity.”
46.  Marie-Claire Bergere, Sun Yat-Sen (Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 2000); Peter Hart, The
I.R.A. and Its Enemies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000); Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging
Revolution:  Russia’s  Continuum  in  Crisis,  1914-1921 (Cambridge,  Harvard  University  Press,  2002);
Timothy Snyder, Sketches of a Secret War (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007).
47.  Michael Reynolds, “The Ottoman-Russian Struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus,
1908-1918:  Identity,  Ideology and the Geopolitics of  World Order,” diss.  Princeton University,
2003, p. 5.
48.  Mustafa Butbay, Kafkasya Hatiraları (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990), pp. 1-2.
49.  Reynolds, “The Ottoman-Russian Struggle,” pp. 518-532. Chechens and Dagestani leadership
more antagonistic towards Russians, Circassians seemingly less so.
50.  Reynolds, “The Ottoman-Russian Struggle,” pp. 560-561. As the war was drawing to a close,
representatives of the North Caucasian Republic lobbied both the Central Powers and members of
the Entente for recognition. See PAAA, R 11061, Telegram from Bernstorff,14 October 1918. 
51.  Reynolds, “The Ottoman-Russian Struggle,” pp. 561-593.
52.  Butbay, Kafkasya Hatiraları, pp. 6-7. 
53.  See Butbay, Kafkasya Hatiraları 19-23; Sefer Berzeg, Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyeti, 1917-1922:II Cilt,
Bağımsızlık  Mücadelesi  (Istanbul,  Birleşik  Kafkaysa  Derneği,  2004),  p. 279.  In  November  1920,
Korkmazof became the chairman of the pro-Soviet Dagestan Revolutionary Committee.
54. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Cilt: I (Ankara, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), pp. 3-4.
55.  Stanford Shaw, From Empire  to  Republic:  The Turkish War of  National  Liberation,  1918-1923:  A
Documentary Study (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), 1455; Zürcher, The Unionist Factor
, p. 121.
56.  Berzeg, Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyeti,pp. 306-307.
57.  Berzeg,  Kuzey  Kafkasya  Cumhuriyeti  366-367;  Rıza Nur,  Hayat  ve  Hatıratım, Cilt  II  (Istanbul,
Atındağ Yayınevi, 1968), p. 589.
58.  Berzeg, Çerkes Göçmenleri, pp. 34-35. 
59.  Avagyan, Çerkesler, pp. 234-235; Berzeg, Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyeti, pp. 328-329, 352; PRO/FO
371/4947/12888, 19 October 1920.
60.  Avagyan, Çerkesler, pp. 236-237.
61.  Avagyan, Çerkesler, p. 237.
62.  Shaw,  From  Empire  to  Republic  1556-1560;  Gotthard  Jaeschke,  “Die  Elviye-i  Salase  Kars,
Ardahan und Batum,” Welt des Islams 18.1-2 (1977),pp. 35-36.
63.  Aksakal? Reynolds, “The Ottoman-Russian Struggle,” p. 160.
64.  Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2010), 151; Reynolds, “The Ottoman-Russian Struggle,” p. 222. 
65.  PRO/FO 371/5169/7554, 2 July 1920.
The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923
European Journal of Turkish Studies , Complete List
18
66.  PRO/FO 371/6269/3304, 15 March 1921.
67.  Shaw, From Empire to Republic, pp. 1552-1556.
68.  “Çerkes Cumhuriyeti,” Tehvir-i Efkar 30 November 1921.
69.  “Çerkeslerin Nokta-ı Nazarı,” Tehvir-i Efkar 2 December 1921.
70.  Ankara’s dispossession of the North Caucasian independence movement did not deter some
exiled members of the Mountaineer Republic from using the Republic of Turkey as a base to
lobby and agitate for North Caucasian rights during the interwar period. However, it is clear that
this small cadre of activists did not see themselves as extensions of Turkish foreign policy (if
anything, Turkey was painted as a historic “occupier” in the region). See Mitat Çelikpala, “The
North Caucasian Emigres Between the Two World Wars,” in Kemal H. Karpat with Robert Zens
(eds.),  Ottoman  Borderlands:  Issues,  Personalities  and  Political  Changes  (Madison,  University  of
Wisconsin Press, 2003), pp. 287-314.
71. Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Alevis, Armenians and Kurds in Unionist/Kemalist Turkey (1908-1938),”
Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, eds.Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, (Leiden,
Brill Press, 2003), pp. 177-196; Robert W. Olson and William F. Tucker, “The Sheikh Sait Rebellion
in Turkey (1925): A Study in the Consolidation of a Developed Uninstitutionalized Nationalism
and the Rise of Incipient (Kurdish) Nationalism,” in Die Welt des Islam 18.3/4 (1978), pp. 195-211.
72.  Şoenu, Çerkes Mes’elesi, pp. 62-77
73.  See  İzzet  Aydemir,  “Gönen-Manyas  Çerkeslerinin  Sürgünü,”  Nart No.  15  (November-
December 1999).
74. Zürcher, Unionist Factor,p. 148.
75.  Avagyan, p. 256. One of the few North Caucasian officers to survive the 1926 purges was
Recep Peker,  a veteran of the War of Independence of Dagestani descent.  He would serve as
minister  of  defense,  finance,  education  and the  interior  over  the  course  of  Mustafa  Kemal’s
tenure as president.
76.  Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists,” p. 174.
77.  For a recent perspective on the historical continuities related to Kurds, see David Romano,
The Kurdish National Movement (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 31-39; For a
perspective on non-Muslims in post-Ottoman Turkey, see Yahya Koçoğlu, Hatırlıyorum: Türkiye’de
Gayrimuslim Hayatlar (Istanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2003). 
78. Çelikpala, “Immigrants to Diaspora”pp. 428-429; Erol Taymaz, “ Kuzey Kafkas Dernekleri,” in
eds.Stefanos Yerasimos et. al., Türkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetcilik, (Istanbul, İletişim Yayınları,
2001), pp. 452-455. 
79.  For  a  comparison  with  Balkan  diaspora  groups  in  Turkey,  see  Alexandre  Toumarkine,
“Kafkas ve Balkan Göçmen Dernekleri: Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik,” in eds.Stefanos Yerasimos
et. al., Türkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetcilik, (Istanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 425-450.
80.  The close relationship to North Caucasian organizations and the Turkish state were most
clearly on display during the Abkhazian crisis of 2008. See Abhazlar’dan ‘Bağımsızlık Yürüyüşü,’
Vatan  1  September  2008  (http://haber.gazetevatan.com/haberdetay.asp?
detay=Abhazlardan_bagimsizlik_yuruyusu_196548_1&tarih=01.09.2008&Newsid=196548&Categoryid=1),
consulted 12 September 2008; Şafak Timur, Turkish Abkhazians Enjoying Independence of Their
Faraway Country,  Turkish  Daily  News  2 September 2008 (http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/
article.php?enewsid=114208),  consulted  12  September  2008;  Ercan  Yıldız,  “Oset  ve  Abhazlara
Mitingli  Destek,”  Sabah  1  September  2008  (http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/09/01//
haber,FF488955A1304EBE80C078E9EBF4F27C.html), consulted 12 September 2008. 
81.  See for example Ertan Altan, “Çerkesler de Anadilde Eğitim İstiyor,” Taraf,10 March 2011
(http://taraf.com.tr/haber/cerkesler-de-anadilde-egitim-istiyor.htm), consulted 20 August 2011;
Hüseyin İstemil, “Çerkeslerin de Artik bir T.C.’si Var,” Taraf, 18 April 2011 (http://taraf.com.tr/
haber/cerkeslerin-de-artik-bir-t-c-si-var.htm), consulted 20 August 2011.
The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923
European Journal of Turkish Studies , Complete List
19
82. See Enver Sağlam,  “Beyaz Türk Çerkesler  Tasfiye Mi Oluyor,”  Taraf,25  May 2011 (http://
taraf.com.tr/haber/beyaz-turk-cerkesler-tasfiye-mi-oluyor.htm), consulted 20 August 2011.
83.  Gareth Jenkins, “Turkey’s ‘Kurdish Opening’: Faces New Challenges,” Turkey Analyst 2.19 (26
October  2009),  (http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2009/091026b.html),
consulted 14 August 2011.
84.  For an in depth study on popular attempts at integrating North Caucasian identity into the
framework of Turkish nationalism see Bayan Ertem, “Dancing to Modernity: Cultural Politics of
Cherkess Nationhood in the Heartland of Turkey,” diss. University of Texas at Austin, 2000.
INDEX
Mots-clés : Anatolie, Circassiens, diaspora, Nord Caucase, Turquie
Keywords : Anatolia, Circassians, diaspora, North Caucasus, Turkey
AUTEUR
RYAN GINGERAS
Naval Postgraduate School
The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1914-1923
European Journal of Turkish Studies , Complete List
20
